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NOTES
LIABILITY FOR MALICIOUS INSTITUTION OF A CIVIL SUIT
A sues B to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of B's negligence. In fact, as A well knows, A has no valid
claim, having fabricated his suit for the purpose of forcing B to agree
to a substantial out-of-court settlement. On the trial of the case
judgment is rendered for B. Can B then maintain an action for dam-
ages based on A's initiation of the unfounded suit? If there is a right
of action, what is B required to prove in order.to recover?
While it is well-established that an individual who has been ma-
liciously prosecuted on a criminal charge can recover damages from
the instigator of the prosecution,' courts generally have been ex-
tremely reluctant to impose liability for the malicious institution of
a civil suit.2 In many jurisdictions an action based on a malicious
suit can be maintained only in an extremely limited category of cases. 3
In those situations in which courts have recognized a right of action,
the burden of proof necessary to recover damages for a malicious
lawsuit has proved almost insurmountable. The purpose of this note
is to analyze the fact situations in which the courts have recognized
a right of action, to suggest considerations essential to the proper
determination of whether, and under what circumstances, a remedy
should be provided, and to set forth the elements of proof which must
be established to maintain an action for damages for the malicious
institution of a civil suit.
I
Under the English common law, a defendant against whom a ma-
licious civil suit was brought could not maintain an action to recover
damages for the malicious suit except in a highly restricted group
of cases, such as bankruptcy proceedings, corporate liquidation pro-
ceedings, and suits accompanied by attachment of property.4 A sub-
stantial number of American jurisdictions have adopted a less restric-
tive version of this rule. In thirteen states' and the District of Colum-
1. NEWELL, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION § 5 (1892); PROSSER, TORTS 860 (1941);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 653 (1938).
2. PROSSER, TORTS 885 (1941).
3. See text supported by notes 5-21 infra.
4. For other proceedings in which the English courts have recognized a ight
of action, see SALMOND, TORTS 738 (11th ed., Heuston 1953). See notes 9, 10
infra.
5. Josey v. Grayson-Robinson, Inc., 84 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. App. 1954); Smith v.
Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898); Aalfs v. Aalfs, 66 N.W.2d
121 (Iowa 1954); North Point Construction Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d
441 (1945); Saumn v. Proudfit, 122 N.J.L. 96, 4 A.2d 35 (1939); Johnson v.
Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 142 P.2d 546 (1943); Serxner v. Elgart, 196
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bia,6 a defendant who has been the victim of a malicious civil suit has
no remedy unless the suit resulted in an "interference" with his per-
son or his property, or other "special injury."
The courts in these states have failed to define clearly the terms
"interference" and "special injury"; consequently, until a case involv-
ing each particular type of suit is decided, it is difficult to determine
what suits will be considered to result in an "interference" or "special
injury." These courts have found an interference with the person
in cases in which a defendant was arrested under civil process,7 and
in various quasi-criminal actions, such as lunacy or bastardy pro-
ceedings., Interference with the property of the defendant has been
found in cases in which the suit was accompanied by ancillary pro-
ceedings, such as attachment or garnishment,9 and in bankruptcy
proceedings,"° proceedings to dissolve a partnership," and in suits in
which injunctive relief was sought 2
Although the courts in these states have frequently stated that no
action will lie for the malicious institution of an "ordinary" civil suit,
such an action may be maintained if the allegedly malicious suit
caused "special injury.","; The cases have failed to delineate ade-
quately what is considered to be an "ordinary" civil suit, merely
stating negatively that an ordinary civil suit is one which causes no
direct interference with the defendant's person or property. An ex-
amination of the cases, however, indicates that suits which courts have
considered to be "ordinary" civil suits have three common elements:
(1) the defendant is brought into court merely by the service of
summons; (2) the suit is not accompanied by ancillary proceedings,
such as attachment of property; (3) the relief sought is, in most
Misc. 1053, 94 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Jerome v. Shaw, 172 N.C. 862,
90 S.E. 764 (1916); Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 489, 56
N.E. 198 (1900); Publix Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa. 346, 32 A.2d
413 (1943); Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Keeland Bros., 60 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1983); Manhattan Quality Clothes, Inc. v. Cable, 154 Wash. 654, 283 Pac.
460 (1929); Myhre v. Hessey, 242 Wis. 638, 9 N.W.2d 106 (1943). See Note,
150 A.L.R. 897 (1944).
6. Peckham v. Union Finance Co., 48 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
7. Woodley v. Coker, 119 Ga. 226, 46 S.E. 89 (1903).
8. Brandt v. Brandt, 297 Ill. App. 306 17 N.E.2d 535 (1938) (lunacy proceed-
ing) ; Coffee v. Meyers, 84 Ind. 105 (1882) (bastardy proceeding).
9. King v. Yarbray, 136 Ga. 212, 71 S.E. 131 (1911) (garnishment); Connelly
v. White, 122 Iowa 391, 98 N.W. 144 (1904) (attachment).
10. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Norin v. Scheldt Mfg. Co.,
297 Ill. 521, 130 N.E. 791 (1921).
11. Luby v. Bennett, 111 Wis. 613, 87 N.W. 804 (1901).
12. H. P. Reiger & Co. v. Knight, 128 Md. 189, 97 Atl. 358 (1916); Black v.
Judelsohn, 251 App. Div. 559, 296 N.Y. Supp. 860 (1st Dep't 1937). See Note,
145 A.L.R. 711 (1943). As the text reveals the cases in which an interference
with the person or property was found are not strictly civil "suits"; for purposes
of this note these cases will be utilized only for illustrative purposes.
13. See, e.g., Saum v. Proudfit, 122 N.J.L. 96, 4 A.2d 35 (1939); Johnson v.
Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 142 P.2d 546 (1943).
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cases, money damages. 4 Since these elements are the typical char-
acteristics of the average lawsuit, it is manifest that the bulk of civil
litigation is included in the "ordinary" civil suit category.
Similarly, most courts have failed to attempt even a cursory
analysis of the meaning of the term "special injury." The usual
formulation is that a suit does not result in special injury where the
damages incurred by the defendant are no different from the expenses
which necessarily result from all suits of similar character, whether
or not maliciously initiated. 5 While this definition would appear to
be sufficiently indefinite to permit virtually any judicial interpretation
which might be desired, in practice the special injury category has
been narrowly restricted. The courts are generally agreed that in-
juries to reputation, credit, or business, and the annoyance, loss of
time, and expense resulting from the defense of an ordinary civil
suit, are not "special injuries," regardless of the severity of the injury
in a particular case.' 6
The most notable situation in which courts recognize a special
injury, and therefore a right of action, is where a party maliciously
institutes successive civil suits for the same claim against the same
person. In the leading case of Shedd v. Patterson'7 the defendant had
previously harassed the plaintiff with nine successive suits over a
twenty-year period. In each case the suit had been dismissed. The
court held that, while no action would lie for the malicious institution
of a single civil suit, the defendant's repeated suits on the same claim
after the court had conclusively determined the rights of the parties
had caused a special injury, and the plaintiff could maintain an action
for damages caused by defendant's malicious conduct. 8 Presented
with the same fact situation, other courts have denied a right of
action, reasoning that, while the amount of the damages might in-
crease with the successive malicious suits, the nature of the injury is
not altered, and that, if recovery is denied for the initiation of a single
malicious suit, the same rule should apply to successive malicious
suits. 9
14. These are the constituent elements of an "ordinary" civil suit in the bulk
of the cases. Certain situations however, have been treated by some courts as
"ordinary" civil suits (for whiefi no recovery is permitted) although the relief
sought was not money damages. For example, a dispossessory action by a land-
lord, Price v. Fidelity Trust Co., 41 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. App. 1947); an action of
ejectment, Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110 (1883) ; an action for recission based
upon. allegations of fraud, Wmi. R. Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Mann, 1'71 Ark.
350, 284 S.W. 42 (1926).
15. Josey v. Grayson-Robinson, Inc., 84 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. App. 1954) North
Point Construction Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441 (1945); Abbott v.
Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 Pac. 302 (1904).
16. See note 15 supra.
17. 302 Ill. 355, 134 N.E. 705 (1922).
18. Ibid. See also, Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
19. Pye v. Cardwell, 224 S.W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Myhre v. Hessey,
242 Wis. 638, 9 N.W.2d 106 (1943).
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Aside from the situation involving successive malicious suits, the
courts have seldom found a special injury which was considered
sufficiently grievous to permit a right of action for the malicious
institution of an "ordinary" civil suit. Several cases have indicated
that special injury might be found when the allegedly malicious suit
contained defamatory charges,20 but in cases in which the problem
was directly in issue the courts did not find special injury, and no
action was permitted.21 Viewed in the light of the previous discussion,
the "special injury" category which has been developed by the courts
which deny a right of action for the malicious institution of an or-
dinary civil suit, appears to be merely a flexible instrument which the
courts can manipulate to achieve desired results. Since the judicial
policy has been to restrict recovery in actions based upon allegedly
malicious lawsuits, the "special injury" concept, while potentially a
broad category, has become a virtual nullity.
In contrast to those states which, in the absence of special circum-
stances, deny a right of action for the malic s institution of a civil
suit, at least eighteen states" recognize such a/right of action regard-
less of whether the malicious suit results if 0n interference with the
defendant's person or property, or in other pecial injury. In these
states, therefore, recovery is dependent onl upon the plaintiff's es-
tablishing the essential elements of proof liecessary to maintain the
action. 3  /
The substantial conflict of authority among the courts as to what
factors must be present to enable a party to maintain an action for
a malicious civil suit is mainly attributable to "policy factors" which
are given varying emphasis by different courts. What policy reasons
are applied by the courts? Are these the basic considerations which
20. See, e.g., Van Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 316, 40
S.E.2d 332, 339 (1946) (dictum); Myhre v. Hessey, 242 Wis. 638, 649, 9 N.W.2d
106, 110 (1943) (dictum).
21. Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898); Aalfs v.
Aalfs, 66 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1954); Serxner v. Elgart, 196 Misc. 1053, 94
N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
22. Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1918); Acker-
man v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932) ; Eastin v. Bank of Stockton,
66 Cal. 123, 4 Pac. 1106 (1884); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084
(1932); Whipple v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 581 (1836); Levy v. Adams, 140 Fla. 515,
192 So. 177 (1939); Whitesell v. Study, 37 Ind. App. 429, 76 N.E. 1010 (1906);
Bratton v. Exchange State Bank, 129 Kan. 82, 281 Pac. 857 (1929); Smith v.
Smith, 296 Ky. 785, 178 S.W.2d 613 (1944); Graffagnini v. Shnaider, 164 La.
1108, 115 So. 287 (1927) ; Anteliff v. June, 81 Mich. 477, 45 N.W. 1019 (1890) ;
Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 142 N.W. 930 (1913);
Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 261 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1953); McCormick Harvester
Mach. Co. v. Willan, 63 Neb. 391, 88 N.W. 497 (1901); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D.
461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 174 N.W. 620
(1919); Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1896); Closson v.
Staples, 42 Vt. 209 (1869). See Note, 150 A.L.R. 897 (1944).
23. See text following note 41 infra.
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should be applied to determine whether, and in what situations, a
right of action arises?
The most frequently discussed factor is the function served by the
award of costs to the successful party in a lawsuit. The courts which
deny a right of action to recover damages for a malicious lawsuit in
the absence of special circumstances have urged, as justification, that
the taxable costs received by the successful defendant are presumed
to be adequate compensation for the injury sustained.24 This so-
called presumption, while historically sound, is now no more than
rationalization. The items of expense which are included as taxable
costs in a suit at law, and the amount of compensation to be awarded,
generally are fixed by statute,25 and vary considerably among the
states. There are, however, several factors common to virtually all
statutory bills of costs. The statutes of each state providing for the
amount of costs to be awarded were enacted, in most cases, early in
the history of the state and have remained substantially unchanged
over the years; as a result of inflated monetary conditions the amount
of compensation has become grossly inadequate. 2" In addition, while
costs usually include relatively minor items such as witness fees, fees
for court officers, and miscellaneous items of trial expense,27 the most
important monetary item in a lawsuit, the expense of counsel fees,
generally is not part of the taxable costs in this country. In England,
the successful party receives counsel fees as part of his costs, in the
discretion of the court. Thus, while there is some justification for
denying a right of action in England, since the award of costs there
approximates the expenses that are actually incurred, there would
seem to be no justification for such a denial in this country.28
Other American courts which deny a right of action in the absence
of special circumstances concede that statutory costs are inadequate
compensation, but insist that the matter is a "legislative problem."
These courts are also indulging in judicial question-begging. It is, of
course, within the legislative province to determine the statutory costs
to be awarded to the successful litigant; the statutory award, how-
ever, does not distinguish between the malicious and unfounded suit,
and the suit which is merely unsuccessful. To distinguish these two
situations would seem to be an appropriate judicial function, to be
exercised by permitting a defendant in a malicious lawsuit to main-
tain a separate action for damages.
24. Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 142 P.2d 546 (1943) ; Publix
Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa. 346, 42 A.2d 413 (1943); Shapleigh
Hardware Co. v. Keeland Bros. Inc., 60 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
25. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 61 (1935).
26. See Note, Use of Taxable'Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants,
53 COLuIVI. L. REV. 78 (1953).
27. Id. at 81, & nn.26, 27 (1953).
28. See MdCORMICK, DAAGES § 60 (1935).
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Another factor advanced to justify denial of a remedy in the ab-
sence of special circumstances is a fear that a party may be deterred
from resorting to the courts, feeling that he might be subjecting him-
self to a subsequent action for having brought a malicious suit.
2 9
While this concern of the courts is doubtless an honest one, its realism
is questionable. Even in those states where an action to recover
damages for a malicious civil suit is freely permitted, recovery is in-
frequent. The realistic considerations which determine whether a
controversy is to be litigated include such factors as the possibility
of success, the expenses of litigation, and the chances of recovery
even if a favorable judgment is received. It is doubtful whether the
average person (or the average lawyer) contemplating whether to
sue realizes that he may be subjecting himself to liability if his claim
proves unsuccessful.3 0
In addition, the courts which have denied a remedy for the malicious
initiation of an "ordinary" civil suit, which comprises the vast bulk
of litigation,31 are giving tacit judicial recognition to a notorious form
of legal blackmail. The institution of, or the threat of, an unfounded
suit is a notably efficient means of extortion from persons who are
financially unable to defend the suit, or who are unwilling, because
of personal or business reasons, to undergo the unfavorable publicity
resulting from a lawsuit.32
There would seem to be little justification, therefore, for the posi-
tion adopted by the courts which refuse to permit a right of action
to recover for a malicious suit unless the action results in an "inter-
ference" with the defendant's person or property, or in "special in-
jury." The courts in which the existence of a right of action is de-
pendent only upon proof that the suit was in fact malicious have not
been overburdened with actions based upon allegedly malicious suits.
In these states recovery is still infrequent, not because no remedy is
recognized, but because of the extreme difficulty of proving that a
suit was in fact instituted maliciously.
33
II
A problem which is closely related to the question of liability for
the institution of a malicious civil suit concerns the liability which is
29. See, e.g., Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898);
Aalfs v. Aalfs, 66 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1954); Abbott v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692,
76 Pac. 302 (1904).
30. The individual who is deciding whether to bring suit may consider that
he will be subjecting himself to a counter-claim by his opponent in the same
action. There is little reason to suspect, however, that the honest litigant would
be deterred from suing because of fear of being sued in return for initiating
unfounded litigation.
31. See text supported by note 14 supra.
32. For an excellent example of extortion by suit see Pye v. Cardwell, 224
S.W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
33. GREEN, JUDGE AND JuyY 338 (1930).
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imposed when the malicious conduct is not the institution of an
unfounded suit, but is the filing of an unfounded defense or counter-
claim. While it might appear that litigation on such matters would
be frequent, there are in fact only two cases in which the problem
was directly presented. In Baxter v. Brown,3 4 a Kansas case, the
payee of a promissory note, upon default in payment, brought suit
against the maker of the note. The maker, in his answer, filed a
general denial that he owed any amount on the note. On the trial of
the case the payee recovered judgment for the amount of his claim.
The payee then sued the maker again, alleging that in the prior suit
the maker had maliciously filed the general denial, knowing that it
was false. The court held that the payee could not maintain an inde-
pendent action for damages, even if it were proved that the maker
had knowingly set up the unfounded defense, since in so doing the
maker had merely hindered and delayed the payee's recovery, and
had not personally sought affirmative relief.
In Slee v. Simpson,3- a Colorado case, the issue before the court
was whether an action could be maintained to recover damages for
the malicious filing of a counter-claim. Defendant, in answer to plain-
tiff's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained in an auto
accident, filed a counter-claim to recover for injuries allegedly caused
by the same accident. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff on his
claim, but defendant's counter-claim was dismissed. Plaintiff subse-
quently brought another action for damages, claiming that the defen-
dant had maliciously filed the unfounded counter-claim. The court
held that the defendant's counter-claim was the equivalent of a sepa-
rate action, and that the plaintiff could recover if, in the subsequent
trial, he could prove that the counter-claim had been instituted mali-
ciously.36
The results of the Baxter and Simpson cases raise several problems.
In theory, the basic legal "wrong" for which liability is imposed for
malicious prosecution, and for the malicious institution of a civil suit,
is the setting in motion of the forces of the law to achieve a purpose
for which they were not intended.37 On this basis, the view of the
Baxter case, denying liability for the fling of a false general denial,
would appear to be correct. It is, of course, an open secret that a de-
fendant will frequently set up defenses which he knows cannot be
proved for the purpose of delaying and additionally burdening the
plaintiff. While such conduct is doubtless unethical, it would be a
startling proposition to subject a defendant to liability in a subse-
34. 83 Kan. 302, 111 Pac. 430 (1910).
35. 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084. (1932).
36. Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 466, 15 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1932).
37. RESTATEMIENT, TORTS § 674, comment a (1938).
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quent suit after the plaintiff had already recovered judgment based
upon his original cause of action 8 The rationale of the Baxter case
would also seem to apply in the situation in which the defendant's
answer is based upon any of the affirmative defenses, such as con-
tributory negligence, fraud, or statute of limitations, since the de-
fendant in such a case is not, in any sense, seeking affirmative relief.
Although the Simpson case does not accord with the traditional
theory that the essential wrongful conduct consists in the malicious
initiation of an unfounded suit, the result of the case is clearly cor-
rect. A counter-claim under the modern codes must contain all the
elements of an affirmative cause of action; both in theory and in prac-
tice a counter-claim is substantially the equivalent of an independent
action."9 Moreover, under the Colorado statute then existing,40 the
defendant could elect to seek his relief either by counter-claim or by
a separate action. Had the defendant in the Simpson case elected to
proceed in a separate action the court would have imposed liability
if his claim had been proved malicious and unfounded.41 It would then
have been anomalous to deny recovery merely because the defendant
elected to seek relief by means of a counter-claim in the original
action. The distinction between the Baxter case and the Simpson case,
therefore, is a substantial one. The defendant's counter-claim in the
Simpson case went beyond mere delaying tactics; he was seeking
affirmative relief and the actual effect of his conduct was the same
as if a separate action had been pursued.
III
Judicial recognition of a right of action to recover for a malicious
civil suit is merely the first step on the road to relief; in a case in
which a remedy is available the plaintiff must also establish that the
prior suit was in fact malicious. The classification of the elements
38. If the plaintiff had not recovered judgment in the original action, then
he would have no basis for asserting that the defense set up by the defendant
was malicious and unfounded, since the court's judgment for the defendant would
establish that his defense was valid.
To deter the filing of sham pleadings a few states provide by statute that a
party filing a bad faith allegation or denial may be taxed with double costs. Note,
Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
78 (1953). In addition, some jurisdictions provide for a speedy disposition of
sham pleadings by a motion to strike the entire pleading and grant summary
judgment where no valid cause of action or defense is stated. CLARK, CODE PLEAD-
ING § 88 (2d ed. 1947).
39. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 102 (2d ed. 1947).
40. CoLO. CODE ANN. § 63 (1933); Herefort v. Cramer, 7 Colo. 483, 4 Pac.
896 (1884). Colorado has since adopted the federal rule providing that a defen-
dant who has a claim that arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim is required to seek relief by
counter-claim in the original action, and if he fails to do so he is deemed to have
waived his claim. Cow. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (1953).
41. Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 465, 15 P.2d 1084, 1085 (1932) (dictum).
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of proof necessary to maintain an action for damages for the malicious
institution of a civil suit is well-established. The party seeking to
recover must prove that the prior suit terminated in his favor, and
that the suit was instituted with malice, and without probable cause. -"
Although the classification of the elements of proof is well-recognized,
their application to varying factual situations has caused consider-
able difficulty. The various elements will be considered separately,
except where the interrelation of the elements requires comparative
treatment.
A. Favorable Termination of the Prior Suit
A party seeking to recover damages for a malicious civil suit in
which he was defendant must prove that the allegedly malicious suit
terminated in his favor.43 Since the result of a suit is a matter of
public record, few problems arise in determining in whose favor an
action terminated. A suit may terminate in favor of the defendant
by either of two methods: (1) when a court renders a final judgment
on the merits in the defendant's favor;44 or (2) when the suit is
dismissed, either voluntarily or involuntarily.4 If a suit is pending
as a result of a temporary continuance, or if an appeal has been
taken to a higher court, no action for damages can be based on such
a suit, since there has been no final termination of the action.4 In
addition, if a suit is terminated by an out-of-court settlement it is
not considered to be a termination "favorable" to the defendant,
and no action for damages can be based on such suit.4 7 When the
allegedly malicious suit has not terminated in favor of the party
against whom the suit was brought, such party is generally pre-
vented by the principle of res judicata from relitigating the contro-
versy in a subsequent action based on the initiation of the supposedly
42. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 674 (1938). In addition, the plaintiff must prove
actual damages since none will be presumed. The damages recoverable in an
action based on a malicious lawsuit are beyond the scope of this note.
43. This is subject to the exception that if the prior suit was an ex 7arte one,
which the original defendant was given no opportunity to contest, then he need
not show that the prior proceeding terminated in his favor. PROSSER, TORTS
889 (1941). For purposes of this section, a plaintiff against whom a malicious
counter-claim was filed will be treated as a defendant. See Slee v. Simpson, 91
Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932).
44. The judgment may be on demurrer or after a jury trial. Ackerman v.
Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 116, 15 P.2d 966, 968 (1932) (demurrer); Levy v. Adams,
140 Fla. 515, 192 So. 177 (1939) (jury trial).
45. Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 117, 15 P.2d 966, 968 (1932) (invol-
untary); Smith v. Burrus, 106 Mo. 94, 16 S.W. 881 (1891) (voluntary); Kolka
v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897) (voluntary). See the discussion in
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 674, comment g (1938).
46. Ehrlich v. Exchange Bank of Savannah, 35 Ga. App. 790, 134 S.E. 809(1926); Lindsay v. Evans, 174 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. App. 1943).
47. Fenton Storage Co. v. Feinstein, 129 Pa. Super. 125, 195 Atl. 176 (1937).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
malicious suit,48 unless he can prove that the prior judgment was
procured by fraud or by perjured testimony. 9
B. Want of Probable Cause
The crucial factor which a party must prove to recover damages
for the malicious institution of a civil suit is that the original plain-
tiff, when he initiated the prior suit,50 did not have probable cause
for pursuing the action.51 There have been various judicial attempts
to define probable cause with precision. However, definitions of
probable cause, like most other definitions, have seldom aided the
actual process of judicial decision. The usual formulation is that
probable cause for a suit exists when the instigator of an action
has a reasonable belief that his claim may possibly be held to be
valid. Essentially, the courts are applying an objective standard to
evaluate the reasonableness of the instigator's belief. If it is deter-
mined that a reasonable man, in similar circumstances, would have
brought suit, then the courts will find that the defendant had prob-
able cause for initiating his action.5 2
While there is an infinite variety of factual situations which pre-
sent the question of whether there was probable cause for the initi-
ation of the supposedly malicious suit, a perusal of the cases reveals
several common factors. First, actions to recover damages for fab-
ricated personal injury suits, which are popularly conceived to be
most often the subject of unfounded litigation, are conspicuously
infrequent. 53 Second, the controversy usually arises between parties
who have had extensive dealings with each other prior to the sup-
posedly malicious suit. The prior relationship of the parties is usually
an economic one, as for example, between business competitors,
debtor and creditor, employer and employee, or landlord and tenant.
At some time during the parties' relations a controversy arises, hos-
tility develops, and litigation ensues. Third, the primary purpose
of a party who maintains an action to recover for the institution of a
48. McCord-Collins Commerce Co. v. Levi, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 50 S.W. 606
(1899)1 Porter v. Mack, 50 W. Va. 581, 40 S.E. 459 (1901).
49. Antcliff v. June, 81 Mich. 477, 45 N.W. 1019 (1890); Wilcox v. Gilmore,
320 Mo. 980, 8 S.W.2d 961 (1928).
50. The fact that circumstances arising after the suit was brought would sup-
port the position of the party initiating the action is not relevant on the question
of probable cause. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 341 (1930).
51. PRossER, ToRTs 890 (1941).
52. Murdock v. Gerth, 65 Cal. App. 2d 170, 150 P.2d 489 (1944); Gray v.
Abboud, 184 Okla. 331, 87 P.2d 144 (1939); Brown v. Keyes, 54 S.D. 596, 223
N.W. 819 (1929).
53. At least two explanations seem plausible: (1) individuals who fabricate
personal injury claims are notably judgment-proof; (2) since the usual fabri-
eated personal injury claim is brought against a large and solvent entity, such
as a public service company, railroad or business establishment, such an organi-
zation is not likely to have a personal interest to vindicate by seeking to recover
for such a suit, and would be satisfied merely to successfully defend the un-
founded suit.
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malicious civil suit is not to seek compensation for his injury through
the award of money damages; rather, the primary purpose is to
punish the instigator of the unfounded suit and to vindicate the
victim's general standing in the community." With these factors in
mind, what legal rationale have the courts developed to aid their
determination of whether the instigator of the action had probable
cause for initiating the litigation?
Since the determination of probable cause involves essentially an
inquiry into whether it was reasonable, under all the circumstances,
for the instigator to have filed his allegedly malicious suit," it would
appear that probable cause would be a question of fact to be decided
by the jury. In fact, however, whether the original complainant had
probable cause for initiating his action is, in most states, a question
which is determined by the court." Thus, allowing the court to deter-
mine whether the instigator of the prior suit had probable cause-i.e.,
a reasonable belief in the possible success of his action-is the crucial
factor which distinguishes an action for the malicious institution of a
civil suit from the usual tort action wherein the question whether an
individual acted as a reasonable man is determined by the jury."
While the result is desirable, the cases have seldom offered an adequate
explanation of why probable cause is determined by the court. The
basic reason is probably to avoid a confusion of issues. The jury is
likely to confuse the fact that the prior suit was unsuccessful with the
real issue, which is whether the original complainant had a reasonable
belief in the possible success of his action at the time he filed suit."
Some courts have made the misleading statement that probable
cause is a "mixed question of law and fact" in any situation in which
there is conflicting evidence on the issue of probable cause. If there
is conflicting testimony on the circumstances under which the party
initiating the suit acted, then the jury's only function is to deter-
mine, under proper instructions, the actual circumstances. D The
court's instructions specify whether the circumstances as found by
54. See, e.g., Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1918) ;
Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Eastin v. Bank of
Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 Pac. 1106 (1884).
55. See text supported by note 52 supra.
56. See, e.g., Murdock v. Gerth, 65 Cal. App. 2d 170, 150 P.2d 489 (1944);
Paranto v. Ball, 132 Conn. 568, 46 A.2d 6 (1946); Kolka v. Jones 6 N.D. 461, 71
N.W. 558 (1897).
57. Dean Prosser says that the determination of probable cause "does not
differ essentially from the determination of negligence." PRossER, TORTS 879(1941).
58. See text supported by note 52 supra.
59. It has been suggested, however, that once the case is sent to the jury for
a general verdict it is probable that the jury will make its decision on the whole
case, and not merely upon the narrow question as to the actual circumstances
under which the party initiating the suit acted. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 342(1930).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
the jury would, or would not, constitute probable cause for the in-
itiation of the action. 0 Thus, by deciding the pivotal question of
probable cause, the courts exercise extensive control over recovery
in actions based upon allegedly malicious suits.
The court, in determining whether the defendant had probable
cause for instituting his action, must decide the difficult question of
whether the defendant reasonably believed that he could establish
a valid claim. Courts have been extremely reluctant to make a de-
tailed inquiry into the facts and circumstances involved in the prior
suit, and have lightened the burden of decision considerably by the
development of a series of evidentiary rules and presumptions which
are uniformly applied to various factual situations. These rules will
be set forth and analyzed in determining whether they offer an ade-
quate basis for deciding the various problems that may arise.
The result of the allegedly malicious suit is an important eviden-
tiary factor in determining probable cause. If the prior suit termi-
nated in favor of the party initiating the action, that fact is con-
sidered as a prima facie presumption of probable cause, even though
the judgment is reversed on appeal.61 This presumption can be re-
butted only by proof that the judgment was obtained by fraud or by
perjured testimony.62 If the prior suit terminated in favor of the
party against whom the action was brought, however, that fact does
not create a presumption, nor is it evidence, of a want of probable
cause for initiating the action.63
While termination of a prior suit in favor of the party against
whom it was brought is not evidence of a want of probable cause, in
several courts the manner by which the suit was terminated is con-
sidered to have an evidentiary effect on the issue of probable cause.
Thus, several cases have held that the fact that the party initiating
the action voluntarily dismissed his suit creates a presumption of
a want of probable cause for the action.6 4 The obvious purpose of
this presumption is to shift the burden of proof of probable cause
to the party who has voluntarily dismissed the suit because of the
court's feeling that such party alone has the evidence necessary to
explain his conduct. The presumption of a want of probable cause
60. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 673, comment d (1938).
61. Beatty v. Puritan Cosmetic Co., 236 Mo. App. 807, 158 S.W.2d 191
(1942); Palmer v. Avery, 41 Barb. 290 (N.Y. 1864). Some cases have stated
that the judgment is conclusive evidence of probable cause, but in fact the con-
clusive character of the prior judgment always can be rebutted by proof that thejudgment was obtained by fraud or perjured testimony.
62. Antcliff v. June, 81 Mich. 477, 45 N.W. 1019 (1890); Ripley v. Bank of
Skidmore, 355 Mo. 897, 198 S.W.2d 861 (1947).
63. Johns v. Gibson, 60 Ga. App. 585, 4 S.E.2d 480 (1939) ; Eickhoff v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 74 Minn. 139, 76 N.W. 1030 (1898).
64. Burhans v. Sandford & Brown, 19 Wend. 47 (N.Y. 1838); Kolka v. Jones,
6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897). Contra, Smith v. Burrus, 106 Mo. 94, 16 S.W.
881 (1891).
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which is applied merely because of a voluntary dismissal by the
instigator of a suit seems to be both harsh and unreasonable. The
privilege of voluntarily dismissing a suit is recognized in virtually
all states, either by statute or by court practice; to make the exercise
of such a privilege a basis for the presumption that the suit was
brought without probable cause seems inequitable. The unreasonable-
ness of the presumption is emphasized when contrasted with the
established rule that an involuntary dismissal in the same fact situa-
tion would not, of itself, create such a presumption.05 Furthermore,
there are many valid reasons why a party would take a voluntary
nonsuit, e.g., absence or death of key witnesses, desire to obtain addi-
tional evidence, or to try the case at a more convenient time and place;
none of these reasons have any connection with the question whether
the instigator of the suit had probable cause for pursuing the action.
- In connection with the evidentiary effect of the termination of the
allegedly malicious suit, a problem which the courts have seldom con-
sidered is the effect on the probable cause question of the trial judge's
refusal to grant a directed verdict. The situation in which the prob-
lem arises is in a suit by A against B, where, after B's motion for a
directed verdict is refused, the case is submitted to the jury which
then renders a verdict for B. The action has terminated in favor of
the defendant B, but does not the judge's refusal to direct a verdict
for B strongly tend to establish that A had probable cause for his
action? In a leading Missouri case, Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co.,60 the
court held that the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict was merely
"equivocal" on the question of probable cause. It is well-recognized
that trial judges, in order to placate participants and avoid reversals,
unnecessarily submit many questions to the jury. Nevertheless, by
refusing to direct a verdict, it would seem that the trial judge is neces-
sarily implying that the jury could render a verdict for either the
plaintiff or the defendant. This is the equivalent of saying that a rea-
sonable man could conclude that the party initiating the suit had a
valid claim, which is the very issue involved in determining whether
the suit was instituted with probable cause.6 7
Another evidentiary rule adopted by the courts to avoid extended
inquiry into the circumstances leading to the supposedly malicious
suit is that if the action was brought in reliance on the advice of
counsel, such advice is conclusive evidence of probable cause, and is
an absolute defense, even though the counsel's advice proved to be
erroneous. 8 There are, of course, few situations in which suit is
65. See text supported by note 63 supra.
66. 261 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1953).
67. See text suported by note 52 supra. It would seem that the court should
find probable cause even in a case in which the trial judge renders a judgment
against the instigator of the action notwithstanding a contrary jury verdict.
68. Baber v. Fitzgerald, 311 Ky. 382, 224 S.W.2d 135 (1949); Thelma Oil &
Gas Co. v. Sinclair Gulf Oil Co., 97 Okla. 5, 222 Pac. 686 (1924).
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brought without aid of counsel. The mere bringing of suit by counsel,
however, does not enable the party initiating the action to assert the
defense. Before the instigator of the action can justifiably rely on
the advice of counsel, he is generally required to prove: (1) that he
made a reasonable investigation to ascertain the true facts of the
controversy; (2) that he made a full disclosure to counsel of all rele-
vant facts; and (3) that counsel advised him that there was a possi-
bility that the claim would be held valid. 9 If there is conflicting evi-
dence on these points the issues of fact are determined by the jury.70
The various evidentiary rules and presumptions developed by the
courts to avoid a detailed inquiry into the facts and circumstances in-
volved in the supposedly malicious suit do not cover every possible
situation. For example, in a case wherein a suit which has been insti-
tuted without counsel's advice terminates in a judgment in favor of
the party against whom the suit was brought there are no operative
evidentiary rules or presumptions to aid in the determination of
probable cause. In such a situation the court necessarily must make a
thorough examination of the facts and circumstances involved in the
allegedly malicious suit. It is submitted that the following factors
should be considered by the courts in determining whether the party
initiating such a suit had a reasonable belief in the possible success
of his action:
(1) The nature of the claim. For example, a "reasonable man"
would be more likely to litigate a controversy involving a
disputed debt, than to bring suit for damages based upon
alleged fraudulent conduct by the defendant.
(2) The complexity of the controversy. A party should, of course,
be allowed greater leeway for mistakenly litigating a mat-
ter involving an extremely complicated fact situation. But,
conversely, where the controversy is complex and the party
initiating suit is ignorant of the legal significance of the situ-
ation, then as a "reasonable man" he should consult an
attorney for advice instead of immediately litigating the
matter.
(3) The reason the supposedly malicious suit ended unsuccess-
fully. Consideration should be given to whether the party
initiating the suit had an erroneous apprehension of the
facts in controversy, or whether he was mistaken about the
legal effect of such facts.71
69. Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. App. 1951); St. Pierre v.Warner 24 R.I. 295, 53 Atl. 41 (1902).
70. White v. Carr, 71 Me. 555 (1880) ; Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.,
123 Minn. 17, 142 N.W. 930 (1931); Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 261 S.W.2d 942(Mo. 1953).
71. For example, a party who has ascertained the facts of the controversy and
has merely mistakenly believed that under such facts he has a cause of action
should be judged less harshly than a party who initiates litigation while in error
as to the facts involved in the controversy.
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(4) The certainty of the law applicable to the controversy. Since
the party initiating the action can make a reasonable mis-
take about the legal principles applicable to his case, the
reasonableness of the mistake will depend partly on whether
the law on the point involved is well-settled, in a state of
confusion, or somewhere in between.
While any one of these factors may not be determinative of the
question whether the party initiating the suit had probable cause for
his action, a judicial examination of all the factors set forth would
provide a relatively sound basis for decision.
C. Malice
If there was probable cause for a suit, then the party initiating
the action cannot be held liable, and the existence of a malicious pur-
pose is immaterial.7 2 If it is established that there was no probable
cause for initiating the action, however, then the question of malice
becomes material, and malice, being a question of fact, is determined
by the jury.73
A party initiating an action has acted with malice when he has
instituted his action for an improper purpose.74 The only proper
purpose for which a suit may be brought is, of course, to secure a
bona fide adjudication of the claim upon which the action is based. A
suit may be brought for an improper purpose, however, even though
the party initiating the action was not motivated by actual malice or
ill-will7 5 But, while actual malice need not be present, something
more than "legal malice" which, in some torts, is implied from the
intentional performance of an unlawful act, must be found by the
jury.78 Thus, a jury may find malice by determining that the primary
purpose of the instigator of the action was not to secure a bona fide
adjudication of his claim. In practice, once it is established that the
suit was instituted without probable cause, the jury generally will
find, as a matter of course, that the party initiating the action acted
with malice, and consequently will impose liability.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing discussion the following propositions are
submitted:
(1) Conceding the validity of the judicial policy against encourag-
ing actions to recover for malicious lawsuits, an undesirable method
72. McKenna v. Heinlen, 128 Cal. 97, 60 Pac. 668 (1900); Johns v. Gibson,
60 Ga. App. 585, 4 S.E.2d 480 (1939); Wilcox v. Gilmore, 320 Mo. 980, 8 S.W.2d
961 (1928).
73. McKenna v. Heinlen, 128 Cal. 97, 60 Pac. 668 (1900); Wilcox v. Gilmore,
320 Mo. 980, 8 S.W.2d 961 (1928).
74. PROSSER, TORTS 891 (1941).
75. R STATEMENT, TORTS § 676, comment b (1938).
76. Compare, for example, the fictitious use of the term "malice" in the tort of
defamation. PROSSER, TORTS 815 (1941).
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of effectuating such policy has been adopted by the courts which deny
a right of action unless the prior suit resulted in an interference with
the person or property, or in other special injury. Common experi-
ence indicates that the injury to an individual's reputation, business,
or earning capacity which can result from an "ordinary" civil suit is
often more severe than the damage caused by suits which these courts
have recognized to be a special grievance. The preferable view is
clearly the one adopted by the courts which allow an action to recover
for a malicious suit regardless of the type of prior suit involved. This
result could be achieved by any one of three methods.
(A) The courts which have denied a remedy in the absence of a
special injury or of an interference with person or property could
adopt the most direct method and simply overrule their prior
decisions.
(B) If these courts feel bound by precedent they can achieve
the same result within their established rationale by a liberal
interpretation of the "special injury" concept.77
(C) If the courts are unwilling to modify the existing situation,
then the legislatures in these states could follow the position of
Connecticut which provides for a statutory right of action78 in
which recovery is governed by the established common-law princi-
ples relative to the elements of proof.
(2) In seeking a permanent solution to the problem caused by the
increasing amount of unfounded litigation, it is suggested that a
realistic deterrent would be an increase in the statutory costs to be
awarded to the successful party to a lawsuit. A statutory provision
for the award to the successful litigant of a reasonable amount for
counsel fees seems desirable.
(3) The judicial policy to restrict recovery in actions based upon
allegedly malicious lawsuits can be effectuated adequately by the
courts themselves, through their control of the element of probable
cause. If the courts properly exercise their function of deciding the
question of probable cause, the reasonably mistaken litigant need not
fear that a jury may find him liable for having initiated an unfounded
action, for the court would not submit the question of his liability to
a jury.
These suggestions should help to achieve a more equitable com-
promise between the judicial desire to insure unfettered resort to the
courts to settle controversies, and the interest of the individual in
being free from unfounded litigation.
EDWARD BEIMFOHR
77. See text supported by notes 13-21 supra.
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8309 (1949).
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